'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891) (where the court talked in terms of a "sacred trust").
The general rule that there can be no recovery for mental disturbance for the breach of a contract, was discarded by the court in the case of a mortician where the parties contracted with the reference to feelings and sentiments and knew that peculiar mental disturbance would result from a breach. Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App.
(1915).
Contra plaintiffs recovered damages for the mental disturbance they experienced when the defendant-morticians negligently failed properly to embalm their father's body for burial in a distant city. Generally, recovery for the mental suffering caused by injuries to personal and domestic security, such as breach of promise to marry, false imprisonment, or libel, is facilitated because the requisite element of malice or wantonness is presumed." In contrast, most courts continue to require definite allegations and proof of malice for recovery for wrongful acts committed against a dead body." 0 The usual rationale is that in mere negligence there is intent neither to offer indignity to the corpse nor to wound the feelings of the plaintiff 1 1 Furthermore, mental disturbance is deemed so remote and beyond ordinary probabilities that no proximate, causal relationship exists between the defendant's negligence and the alleged injury.
12
If actions sounding in contract are brought, the majority of cases hold that there can be no recovery"' because the mental disturbance is deemed to be neither foreseeable nor in the minds of the parties when the contract was made. 4 194o) , in which the plaintiff was denied recovery for negligent breach of contract when he failed to prove that the defendant-mortician's employees "maliciously" snatched jewelry from the body of his dead wife prior to burial. The defendant was guilty only of a violation of instructions or a mere breach of contract for which the plaintiff suffered only mental disturbance which was insufficient for recovery.
especially aware of the deep emotional ramifications of their conduct. 15 Thus, mental suffering is considered foreseeable" 6 and the proximate result of any breach of duty or contract.1 7 These courts view any indignity to a dead body, intentional or negligent, as, by its very nature, sufficient ground of recovery in contract for resulting mental anguish."
There are exceptional areas in the law of cadavers where courts, which normally require a showing of wilfulness, allow recovery for mere negligent infliction of mental disturbance. The so-called "Texas rule, 19 for example, permits recovery for mental anguish resulting from the negligent mishandling of telegraphic death messages. 20 An extension of the "Texas rule" has also found some acceptance in cases of negligent misdelivery or mistreatment of a dead body by common carriers. 21 The basic rationale of the telegraph and common-carrier decisions is that, since the parties contract with full awareness of the peculiar emotional and sentimental elements associated with transactions concerning dead bodies, no showing of conduct exceeding mere negligence is necessary. Such considerations seem .no less compelling in the case of a contract with a mortician for the preparation of a body for burial. 22 
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The traditional approach requiring a positive showing of wilfulness or wantonness 2 3 in this class of cases is unrealistic. 24 The majority view is often justified by raising the spectre of fraudulent daims. 2 1 It seems obvious, however, that the usual dose kinship and sentimental attachment of the plaintiff to the loved-one whose remains are violated insure the existence of genuine mental disturbance and greatly obviate the danger of feigned claims. 2 " Accordingly, many courts, when faced with mere negligent conduct and with precedents embodying the traditional approach, nonetheless allow recovery by resorting to legal fictions 7 and judicial niceties. 8 The traditional approach concerning dead bodies represents a definite inadequacy in the law for the recovery of damages for mental dis-" See note 6 supra.
"Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913) . All that the court would do was suggest a legislative enactment to allow a recovery for mere negligence. "And we think it may be safely laid down as a general rule that an injury to any right recognized and protected by the common law [referring to the quasi-property right in the next of kin for purposes of burial] will, if the direct and proximate consequence of an actionable wrong, be a subject for compensation." Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 1' See note 9 supra. 2 7 Renihan v. Wright, iz5 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (189o). Here the defendantmortician negligently allowed the body of an infant child to be buried in a spot unknown to himself. When the parties asked where their child was, he answered, "Your child is in Ohio." The court allowed recovery for mental disturbance for breach of a -contract of bailment. Obviously this is a judicial fiction since only property can be bailed. Other courts go no further than recognizing a quasi-property right in the corpse which is in itself a fiction, as the property right did not exist while the decedent is living, cannot be conveyed, has no pecuniary value, and has only one purposeburial, which actually is a source of liability to the next of kin.
"In Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 AUt. 273 (1927), the defendant's act amounted to transferring a corpse from one coffin to a smaller, but more expensive, unselected coffin in order to insure prompt delivery for burial. The railroad could not accept the selected larger coffin in the absence of a shipping box which at that time was unavailable and thus the reason for the exchange. The plaintiff was charged no increase in price, but still recovered for mental anguish, since the jury found a gross indignity was heaped upon the deceased. compensation was awarded to decedent's parents when a coroner acting under the _alleged authority of a statute had the deceased embalmed. It was held that the statute was not a defense, for it required that the deceased be an unknown person, and the evidence tended to show that there was sufficient identification upon the body for the coroner to have discovered its identity.
[Vol. i96o: x35 turbance. This inadequacy would best be remedied by a frank admission that negligent mutilation or indignity to human remains is sui generis" 2 and damages for mental disturbance should be awarded without proof of aggravated misconduct.Y 0 Total abandonment of the anachronistic traditional approach would be a realistic and salutary innovation. 1938) (where defendant's servants negligently overturned a hearse and the relatives of the deceased recovered for mental distrubance even though they did not see the accident).
81 cBut I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment." CARnOzo, THE NAUaRE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCEss 1So
(1g92).
